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ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACT THAT WEST VALLEY CITY PURCHASED THE UNDERLYING 
FEE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HAS NO EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME 
OF THIS CASE. 
Despite Martin's protests to the contrary, this case is not about West Valley City 
attempting to deprive Martin of compensation that he was otherwise entitled to or 
expecting. The City has nothing to gain since it already has paid the previous owner for 
the property. Rather, this case is about Martin attempting to exploit the simple fact that 
West Valley City purchased, rather than condemned, the fee interest in the property, in 
order to received a financial windfall that he would not have otherwise received. 
Almost all of Martin's arguments in this case boil down to one central theme. 
Martin believes that because West Valley City purchased the office building property 
rather then condemning it, the rules somehow changed with respect to how he is treated 
under his lease. For example, Martin argues on page 16 of his brief that the Martin Lease 
presumes that both the landlord and the tenant's interest will be condemned. (Appellee's 
Brief, page 16). On page 17 of his brief, he states: "Through the magic combination of 
condemnation and contract law the City has devised a way to condemn property without 
having to pay a penny of just compensation." (Appellee's Brief, page 17). This 
argument is entirely without foundation in either law or logic and it is not surprising that 
Martin does not cite a single case in its support. 
In reality, West Valley City is attempting to treat Martin exactly the same way it 
would have if the City had condemned the entire building. In that case, there is no doubt 
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that Sections 19.01 and 19.05 of the Martin Lease would apply and Martin would be 
prohibited from sharing in any condemnation award. Even Martin understands this 
concept because on page 14 of his brief he states: "The City's argument that Mr. Martin 
is cut off from sharing in the condemnation award might have merit if the City had 
condemned the entire building." (Appellee's Brief, page 14). See also Footnote 1 of 
Appellee's Brief. (Appellee's Brief, page 12). 
Martin's argument that the law, and the Martin Lease, somehow changed because 
the City purchased the underlying fee interest is entirely made up out of thin air. His 
assertion that the condemnation clause of the Martin Lease "presumes" that the entire 
property would be condemned has no basis whatsoever in the terms of the Lease itself, 
nor has Martin offered any evidence that the parties made such a presumption. In any 
case, such parol evidence would not be admissible since the terms of the Lease are not 
ambiguous. The four corners doctrine would limit Martin to showing such a presumption 
within the terms of the Lease itself. No such language exists. Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, \ 12, 40 P.3d 599, 605 ("If the 
language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions 
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may 
be interpreted as a matter of law.") 
The situation in this case is not that West Valley City has cleverly devised a way 
to deprive Martin of his compensation, as suggested in his argument. It is simply that 
Martin bargained that compensation away through the terms of his Lease, and is now 
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having trouble living with the terms of his bargain. Martin seems to think that West 
Valley City should have paid full price for the property purchased from Heartland and 
then also paid him for the value of his leasehold. That result is clearly contrary to Utah 
law, since the value of the sum of various parts of a parcel of property cannot exceed the 
value of the whole. State By and Through Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 
(Utah 1975). 
There is ample case law to support West Valley City's contention that, despite the 
City's purchase of the fee interest, the terms of the Lease are valid and should be 
enforced, and that West Valley City should be able to rely on them as would any other 
party. For example, in United States v. Petty Motor Company, 327 U.S. 372, 90 L.Ed. 
729, 66 S.Ct. 596 (1946), the United States Supreme Court handled a very similar 
situation. 
In the Petty case, the United States government originally brought a 
condemnation suit against the property owner/landlord and all of the tenants, including 
tenant Independent Pneumatic Tool Company (the "Tool Company"). During the course 
of the litigation, the landlord and the government reached a settlement and the landlord 
was dismissed from the lawsuit. Petty, at page 598. That left a situation very similar to 
the situation at hand, a condemnation suit against a tenant where the condemnor and the 
landlord have reached a settlement. 
The Petty court then determined that the Tool Company was not entitled to 
compensation for its leasehold interest because the Tool Company had contracted that 
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right away through a condemnation clause in its lease.1 The Court stated: "The lease of 
the Independent Pneumatic Tool Company included a clause for its termination on the 
Federal Government's entry into possession of the leased property for public use. The 
events connected with the Government's entry just set out appear to meet the 
requirements for termination." (Footnote omitted). Petty, at page 599. 
The Supreme Court then went on to hold that: "If the Tool Company, with its 
termination on condemnation clause, was the only tenant and condemnation of all 
interests in the property was decreed, the landlord would take the entire compensation 
because the lessee would have no rights against the fund. There would appear to be no 
greater right where the landlord has been otherwise satisfied. Condemnation proceedings 
are in rem, [Citations omitted] and compensation is made for the value of the rights 
which are taken. [Citations omitted]. The Tool Company contracted away any rights 
that it might otherwise have had. We are dealing here with a clause for automatic 
termination of the lease on a taking of property for public use by governmental authority. 
With this type of clause, at least in the absence of a contrary state rule, the tenant has no 
1 The condemnation clause in Petty read as follows: "If the whole or any part of the 
demised premises shall be taken by Federal, State, county, city or other authority for 
public use, or under any statute, or by right of eminent domain, then when possession 
shall be taken thereunder of said premises, or any part thereof, the term hereby granted 
and all rights of the Lessee hereunder shall immediately cease and terminate, and the 
Lessee shall not be entitled to any part of any award that may be made for such taking, 
nor to any damages therefor except that the rent shall be adjusted as of the date of such 
termination of the Lease." Footnote 4, United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 
375,66S.Ct, 596, 598(1946). 
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right which persists beyond the taking and can be entitled to nothing." [Footnote 
omitted]. Petty, at pages 598-599. 
Another analogous case is Bradley Facilities, Inc., v. Burns, 551 A.2d 746 (Conn. 
1988). In the Bradley case, a state government landlord condemned its lessee. The 
lessee attempted to argue that the lease condemnation clause should not apply to 
condemnation by its landlord, but rather only should apply when both the landlord and 
tenant are condemned. Bradley, at page 749. This is virtually the same argument as 
Martin is making. The Supreme Court of Connecticut understood the illogical nature of 
this argument and found as follows: 
"The position of the plaintiff is that, if a condemning authority, whether state of 
federal, should choose to take only its leasehold interest, the parties intended the 
condemnation clause formula not to apply. It is highly improbable, however, that such an 
intention would have been entertained because it would result in the plaintiff receiving 
significantly disparate amounts as compensation for the taking of the same leasehold 
interest depending upon whether the fee was also taken." Bradley, at pages 749-750. 
As the Bradley court correctly recognized, to throw out the condemnation clause 
merely because the condemnor is also the landlord makes no logical sense. By what 
logical rationale should the lessee compensation be wildly different because of who is 
condemning? And by what logical rationale should the government be discriminated 
against by not allowing it to rely on the plain terms of a contract? 
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These cases expose Martin's theory for what it is, a baseless attempt to create an 
income where none was due or expected. Clearly the City can rely on the plain language 
of the Lease by which Martin has agreed to take no compensation in the case of 
condemnation. The trial court erred when it failed to enforce the terms of the Lease and 
grant summary judgment to West Valley City. 
II. THE LEASEHOLD INTEREST OF MARTIN WAS TERMINATED BY 
THE OPERATION OF THE SELF-EXECUTING TERMS OF SECTION 
19.01 OF THE LEASE. 
Martin makes the argument that the Lease has been terminated by operation of 
law, rather than through the eminent domain termination provision of Section 19.01 of 
the Lease. He then argues that the lease simply vanishes and, therefore, the 
condemnation provision is unenforceable. Section 19.01 of the Lease provides for 
termination of the Lease on the date that possession is taken by the condemning 
authority, so one would assume that the asserted termination by law would have to occur 
prior to that event. He refers to the "condemnation of the lease" as the time at which the 
lease is terminated by law, but never tells us what that means. It is unclear whether he 
means it terminated at the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy. Martin cannot literally mean the "condemnation" of the Lease. 
No final order of condemnation has yet been issued, and the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy is an interim order, issued pendente lite. Utah State Road Com 'n v. Friberg, 
687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984). 
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As support for his position, Martin quotes from the case of Redevelopment Agency 
of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989). (Appellee's Brief, page 
12). However, Martin's argument fails based on the clear language of the Daskalas case 
itself. The terms of the Lease in this case and the language of Daskalas are in complete 
harmony. 
The entire quote from the Daskalas case is as follows: 
"The generally accepted rule is that if the condemning authority takes an estate in 
fee simple absolute in all of the real property covered by the lease, the lease thereupon 
terminates." [Citations omitted]. Thus in a total taking, any right which the lessee may 
have to share in the condemnation award becomes vested at the time of the taking, absent 
an agreement to the contrary. [Citations omitted]. The time of the taking is generally 
considered to be the time at which the condemning authority actually takes possession of 
the property, not the time at which the initial complaint is served." (Emphasis added). 
Daskalas, at page 1121. 
The triggering event for the suggested common law termination of the Lease is 
exactly the same as the triggering event for the contractual termination of the Lease. 
Clearly, the Lease was not terminated by law prior to the condemnation clause of the 
Lease becoming effective. The actions happened simultaneously. The condemnation 
clause provisions of the Lease are effective, valid, and should be enforced by this Court. 
This attempt by Martin to avoid application of the plain language of the Lease that he 
agreed to should be denied. 
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III. THE VALUE OF MARTIN'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST IS NOT $60,000. 
On November 12, 2001, the landlord, Heartland, and West Valley City amended 
the Real Estate Purchase Agreement whereby Heartland paid West Valley City $60,000 
to be released from its obligation to cause Martin to vacate his Lease prior to March 1, 
2002. Martin now argues that this payment constitutes a representation of the value of 
his leasehold interest. That representation is not accurate and there is absolutely no 
support for that contention in the record of this case. 
First, it should be remembered that Martin has bargained away his right to share in 
any compensation award. Therefore, the value of his leasehold really doesn't have any 
bearing on the outcome of this case. However, it should be noted that the $60,000 
payment from Heartland to West Valley City does not represent the value of Martin's 
leasehold interest. 
At the time the property was purchased, West Valley City paid additional funds to 
Heartland with the idea that Heartland would use those funds to work wilh first-floor 
tenants to ensure that they vacated the building no later than March 1, 2002 and to assist 
them in finding space in which to relocate. As part of that agreement, the fourth 
paragraph of the Assignment of Leases specifically recognizes that the City may use 
eminent domain, if necessary, to evict first-floor tenants. In such case, Heartland agreed 
to be liable for all litigation costs and expenses including appraisal and attorney's fees. 
(Assignment of Leases, Exhibit B to Appellee's Brief). Heartland's payment to the City, 
as set forth in the Amendment to Real Estate Purchase Agreement, relieved Heartland of 
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day of d4^Ju/hfr r , 2004. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
J. Riqjiard Catten, Deputy CityAttorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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